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Abstract 
Empirical studies on governance recommend the need to develop codes of governance to guide managerial 
behaviour and enhance institutional management. In this vein, various codes of governance such as the Cadbury 
Code and the Kings Code have been developed to steer governance in the corporate world. On the other hand the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and International Organisation of Pension 
Supervisors (IOPS) have issued guidelines with regard to governance in the pension fund industry. This paper 
develops a code of governance for Kenyan retirement benefit schemes. Multiple approaches namely document 
review, interviews with regulators and service providers (fund managers, actuaries, custodians and administrators) 
and survey with trustees and members of retirement benefit schemes are used to draw inferences and develop the 
code. The study uses the population of service providers and a sample of 314 trustees and 1106 members. 
Qualitative data is transcribed and recorded in to coherent themes to address the study objective. Data reduction 
was carried out by use of Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) while factor extraction was done using the Maximum 
Likelihood approach available in SPSS 21. Principal Components Analysis (PCA) was used to extract maximum 
variance from the data set with each component thus reducing the large number of variables to in to smaller set of 
variables. The results yield eleven blocks that are used to build the code of governance. The blocks are;   
compliance with regulatory framework, information control systems, decision taking, managing conflicts of 
interest, monitoring, oversight and performance management, documentation of trustee responsibilities, risk 
management, transparency and accountability, competence of trustees, trustees’ responsibilities to members and 
providing relevant information to members. Trustees are urged to use these blocks and the factors that loaded on 
them to construct customized code of governance for their retirement benefit schemes. Regulators are also urged 
to use the code while developing pension governance regulations. 
Keywords: code of governance, pension governance, retirement benefit schemes  
 
1.0 Introduction 
Proper corporate governance contributes to efficient management that result to investor confidence, market 
integrity, protection of minority interests and maximization of shareholder value (Abu-Tapanjeh, 2006; OECD 
2009) and reduces the agency problem. As a result, investors devote to pay a premium for investment in firms with 
good governance (Mckinsey, 2002).  
Governance lapses have been noted in both developed and developing countries. Developing countries 
have specifically been on the spot light due to weak laws and regulations (Rossouw, 2005) corruption and 
bureaucracy (Deflem, 1995; Kaufmann, Kraay & Mastruzzi, 2009) and lack of enforcement mechanisms (Okpara, 
2011).   
World Bank (1988; 1989; 2013) attributes poor corporate and economic governance to bad governance 
practices that create “severe institutional and managerial weaknesses in the public and private sectors.” As a result, 
focus has shifted to the improvement of governance to strengthen firms in both the private and public sectors. For 
instance, the World Bank was dynamically involved in over 600 governance programs in 95 countries and public 
sector reforms in over 50 countries in less than five years effective 1996 (Santiso, 2002). In a nutshell, good 
governance at the country and company level is essential for the flow of both domestic and foreign investments 
(OECD, 2004; Claessens & Fan, 2003), which should be embodied in governance codes. 
Codes of governance have been formed as a reaction to financial crises and corporate failures and 
impulsion by international organizations such as World Bank and OECD as alternatives to hard laws (for instance 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002 in the United States of America). The Cadbury Report of 1992 was necessitated by 
the Black Monday (19 October 1987) when the US stock market lost 25% of its aggregate value in a few hours, 
collapse of BCCI in 1991 and the corporate responsibility scandal relating to the Mirror Group and its founder – 
Robert Maxwell. Further developments in the UK code of governance issued by the Financial Reporting Council 
in 2010 was reactionary to the 2008 financial crisis. 
Initial corporate governance codes were formulated in developed countries (North, 1990; La Porta, 
Florencio & Shleifer, 2008), which have since been mimicked by developing countries (Hearn, 2011) with 
suboptimal results as developing countries have different market structures, weaker regulatory enforcement 
mechanisms and opposing corporate cultures.  
Codes of governance developed in different jurisdictions are relatively similar (Cromme, 2005) and have 
led to establishment of independent non-executive directors, preservation of minority rights in corporates, 
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diversification of skills in the boards, reduction of conflicts of interest, oversight over management, establishment 
of board and audit committees, lesser losses to shareholders and more disclosures in the financial reports. 
Governance codes have however been criticized as they are reactionary to market wobbles, their success at 
corporate level depend on the strength of the country’s laws, contributes to organizational bureaucracy and cannot 
stop corporate mishaps in the absence of personal commitments by the directors.    
For a code of governance to be effective, attention must be paid to both the spirit and letter of the code 
and must be enhanced through interaction between the boards and shareholders and enforced through laws and 
regulations (La Porta et al, 2000;  Werder, Talaulicar, & Kolat, 2005; Berglöf & Claessens, 2006; Aguilera & 
Cuervo-Cazurra, 2009). Effectiveness of a governance code can only be measured by considering its ability to 
steer relationships amongst the stakeholders, which must be enforced through regulation otherwise implementation 
on its own does not work. For instance Mulili and Wong (2011) document that the institutionalization of a 
supervisory body the Capital Markets Authority (CMA) in Kenya in 1990 did not lead to “fundamental” changes 
in corporate governance.  
Pension governance has gained increased attention due to the dominance of the pension fund industry 
across the World (Njuguna, 2011; 2016). Arguably then, trustees deal with momentous funds in a multifarious 
investment world where uncertainty and volatility are the norm and not exception. Notably, pension funds are 
economic entities that exemplify long-term commitments that outlive the sponsors and current managers (Clark, 
2004). Clark thus argues that the pension systems should be robust, adaptive to the future circumstances and 
innovative to identify future governance gaps primarily because in the future, employers will play less significant 
roles in pension plan systems. For this reason, governance systems need to be documented and strictly enforced to 
ensure that the costs of running the pension systems are managed, relationships between the main stakeholders 
(sponsors, members, external service providers and trustees) are managed, risks are considered and managed, 
regulations are complied with and the welfare of the members is maximized. Moreover, the centrality of pension 
funds makes them face increasing pressures, which are not clearly understood (Miller & Funston, 2014). 
This paper uses postulates in other studies, an exploratory study and triangulation with stakeholders in 
the development of a pension code in a developing market that is relatively younger compared to the developed 
jurisdictions. Moreover lots of attention is directed to corporate governance codes and the effects they have on 
performance, whose principles are not explicitly applicable to pension plans and retirement benefit schemes that 
are principally formed to provide retirement benefits to the members – who may not have the traditional 
shareholder activism principles of loyalty, voice and exit. There is therefore a lacuna on the codes of pension 
governance more specifically in developing countries.    
The paper is structured as follows; section 2 details the theoretical foundations of governance and codes 
of governance, section 3 discusses the research methodology, section 4 gives the findings of the study, section 5 
discusses the results while section 6 states the conclusions and recommendations of the study. 
 
2.0 LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Theoretical foundation of the study  
Scholars agree that the foundation of corporate governance primarily lies in the agency, stakeholder and stewardhip 
theories. These theories are discussed in sections 2.1.1, 2.1.2 and 2.1.3.    
2.1.1 Agency theory 
Agency theory postulates the conflicts of interest stemming from separation of ownership and management in 
contexts where human beings are self-centered and fail to act in the best of the interests of others (Berle & Means, 
1932) granted that the firm is a nexus of contracts (Alchian & Demstez, 1972; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Jensen, 
2001). In this context, corporate governance is viewed as the framework that addresses how the inherent conflicts 
arising out of the agency problem are addressed within the firm and the inherent cost of managing such conflict. 
Figure 1 depicts the agency model. 
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Figure 1: The Agency Model 
2.1.2 Stakeholder theory 
The stakeholder theory is based on the notion that a corporate entity exists to serve its broad range of stakeholders 
who are primarily the shareholders (Abrams, 1951) granted that the firm impacts on parties who are external to it 
either directly or indirectly (McDonald & Puxty, 1979; Freeman, 1984; Clarkson, 1995; Sundram & Inkpen, 2004). 
Firms therefore have an obligation to identify the stakeholders (whether consubstantial, contextual or contractual) 
and their specific needs (Lashgari, 2004; Coleman, Hacking, Stover, Fisher-Yoshida & Nowak, 2008) and develop 
policies to address these concerns. Corporate governance from this perspective is the framework that ensures that 
the often conflicting interests of all the stakeholders are addressed in a fair manner by the firm. Pension plans are 
organizations created to benefit current members, future pensioners, beneficiaries of current members (in the event 
that current members are incapacitated or deceased), the plan sponsor and the investors in the company. Figure 2 
depicts the stakeholder model. 
 
Figure 2: The stakeholder model (Donaldson & Preston (1995, p. 69) 
2.1.3 Stewardship theory 
Stewardship theory emphasizes the absence of conflict between managers and owners (Donaldson & Davis, 1991) 
emphasizing that the goal of governance is to find mechanisms and structures that coordinate the managers and 
the owners. Hence the authors do not see the problems of executive control expounded by Jensen and Mecklin in 
their 1976 agency theory. As such, alignment of the manager’s interests with those of the firm are prerequisite to 
application of stewardship (Van Slyke, 2006). The theory is however static and reviews managerial behaviour one 
point in time and fails to take in to account the evolution of managerial behaviour occasioned by market dynamics 
(Pastoriza & Arino, 2009). Additionally, Turnbull (1997) disapproves the “naturally trustworthy” manager as 
simplistic assumption that may not be generalized in a context of cultural and institutional turbulences that have 
challenged the status quo.  
 
2.2 Corporate governance codes 
Globally, corporate codes of governance are provided within the company law framework within the jurisdiction 
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in which the company operates. The codes are formulated by the government, embodied in legislation and 
generally guide professional bodies and the corporate boards. Aguilera & Cuerro-Cazurra (2009) document the 
pioneers of codes of governance as the United States (1978), Hong Kong (1989) and United Kingdom (1992) and 
report an additional 196 distinct codes in 64 countries by mid-2008. Broadly the codes address six major themes 
namely; balance of executive and non-executive directors, segregation of duties, timely provision of information, 
transparency, understandable financial reporting and maintenance of a sound internal control framework (Gregory, 
1998; Gregory & Simmelkjael, 2002). Over the years, the codes of governance have expanded to include 
relationships with stakeholders outside the firm in line with the stakeholder’s theory. 
The United Kingdom code of governance issued by the Financial Reporting Council in 2010, code has 
five main areas namely; Leadership, Effectiveness, Accountability, Remuneration and Relationships with 
Shareholders. 
 
2.3 Pension codes of governance 
Various studies have pointed to the need for enactment of code of governance applicable to the pension industry. 
For instance, Gregory (1998) stated that the purpose of pension fund governance in the United States was more on 
responsibility refraction rather than creation of value to stakeholders; Ambachtsheer, Capelle & Scheibelhut (1997) 
discovered governance lapses in US pension funds; Ambachtsheer, Capelle & Lum (2008) observed weak 
oversights, conflicts of interest and competing financial interests of different stakeholder groups. Additionally, 
Clark, Caerlewy-Smith and Marshall (2006) suggest governance deficits in UK.  
The principal pension governance lapses established in these studies are; unique agency problems of 
pension funds (balancing interests of different stakeholders and regulatory issues), oversight responsibilities of 
trustees,  skills and knowledge possessed by trustees, investment and risk management aspects and trustee 
effectiveness (in formulation of strategic direction of the fund and maintenance of effective systems of risk 
management).   
 
3.0 METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Research design 
To develop a code of governance, it was imperative that both qualitative and quantitative approaches be used. The 
qualitative approach involved comprehensive document reviews (RBA Act, Companies Act Cap 486 and 
internationally accepted good pension governance practices such as those issued by IOPS and OECD) and 
interviews with key informants in the industry (regulators, administrators, fund managers, actuaries and 
custodians). The quantitative approach used a questionnaire survey with the dispersed stakeholders (trustees and 
members). Eventually a communicative validity of the results was done with all the stakeholders at different levels.  
 
3.2 Population and sampling design 
The sampling frame for service providers in the Kenyan retirement benefits industry was obtained from the RBA 
website (www.rba.go.ke) with the intention of conducting a census. Introductory letters were sent to the CEOs of 
these organizations asking them to nominate individuals who directly deal with retirement benefit schemes to 
participate in the Focus Group Discussions. In total 42 respondents were nominated from all the service providers 
and six focus group discussions were conducted with the different clusters of respondents. The findings of the 
discussions informed the composition of the sample for the trustees and members. Specifically, the findings 
pointed to a survey of large and small retirement benefit schemes and retirement benefit schemes that have invested 
in alternative assets (real estate and unquoted equity) and schemes where the government is a sponsor as schemes 
with special governance challenges and hence the need to delve deeper in to them in addition to the other schemes. 
For the questionnaire survey, the population consisted of 1996 retirement benefit schemes. Forty six schemes were 
first identified as they were considered large, had invested in alternative assets or were sponsored by the Kenyan 
government. Random sampling was used to select an additional 255 retirement benefit schemes (5% margin of 
error). The sample consisted of 1202 members (response rate = 92%, n=1106) and 350 trustees (response rate = 
90%, n=314) who were all randomly selected from the sampled schemes to participate in the survey. 
 
3.3 Data collection tools 
3.3.1 Interview guides 
The Focus Group Discussions used a set of open ended questions that were developed to using the results of 
document reviews and preliminary discussions with the regulators. The questions specifically sought answers on; 
the current state of governance in retirement benefit schemes with regard to risk management, conflicts of interest, 
internal controls, fiduciary duties of trustees, decision making, accountability and transparency of operations; 
compliance with the regulations; governance gaps and practical recommendations to solve the governance gaps 
that were identified. Respondents were allowed to delve in to other issues relevant to the study but were not 
adequately captured by the interview guides. Comprehensive results of the outcomes of these focus group 
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discussions are documented in Njuguna (2016).  
3.3.2 Questionnaires  
Two sets of questionnaires were developed to enhance a 360-degree understanding of all the issues raised during 
the Focus Group Discussions with the service providers. The questions consisting of the thematic areas identified 
in section 3.3.1 asked respondents to indicate the extent to which they agreed or disagreed with the propositions 
of governance with regard to the current state, the gaps and recommendations that were stated in a likert scale. The 
questionnaires also had open ended questions that allowed the respondents to make comments on issues that they 
felt were important and could have been omitted from the questionnaire.  
 
3.4 Research procedures 
3.4.1 Focus group discussions 
Separate focus group discussions were conducted with the different constituents namely; fund managers, 
custodians, administrators and actuaries. The respondents were made aware of the ethical issues that the 
researchers subscribe to namely; confidentiality, fair treatment, right to withdraw from the interview if they felt 
offended, not to be recorded without consent and freedom of expression and thought. After introduction, the 
respondents were split in to manageable groups (minimum 4 and maximum 6). The research team guided the 
interviews and consequently moderated the debate. In total 7 Focus Group Discussions were conducted with 42 
respondents. 
3.4.2 Questionnaire survey 
Consent was first sought from the CEOs of the companies of the sampled occupational retirement benefit schemes, 
those who failed to give consent to participate in the study were omitted and the sample unit (scheme) replaced. 
Respondents (members and trustees) were then selected randomly from the schemes that consented to participate 
in the study.  
Pilot tests were first done with 30 schemes that were randomly selected. The results of the pilot test were used to 
improve the questionnaires making them easy to administer and apply. The drop and pick approach was used to 
elicit responses, again maintaining confidentiality, fair treatment and freedom of expression and thought. The data 
obtained was cleaned and analyzed accordingly to draw the inferences in this study.  
 
3.5 Data Analysis 
3.5.1 Qualitative data 
Qualitative data obtained from document reviews and Focus Group Discussions with the key informants was 
transcribed and arranged in specific themes that emerged. These themes formed the basis of development and 
refinement of the questionnaires that were administered to the trustees and members of the retirement benefit 
schemes. 
3.5.2 Quantitative data 
Quantitative data from the member and trustee surveys was first summarized using frequency distributions and 
descriptive statistics. Further analysis was conducted using Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) that is widely 
considered to be a data reduction tool that eradicates redundancy from a set of correlated variables thus forming 
latent and observed variables that are relatively independent of one another (Kline, 1994; Child, 2006; 
Bartholomew, Knott & Moustaki, 2011). 
To use EFA, it was necessary to ensure that the data fitted the assumptions stated in Costello & Osborne 
(2005) and Field (2009). Specifically, the sample sizes in both the member and trustee surveys exceeded 300, the 
variables were not inter-correlated (there was little multi-collinearity as all the variables, had correlation 
coefficients less than 0.6) and the variables have a roughly normal distribution. Additionally other conditions for 
use of EFA were fulfilled, namely; linear relationship between the factors and the variables (Gorsuch, 1983), each 
factor of analysis having at least 5 to 10 observations (Comrey & Lee, 1992) and at least 10:1 ratio of respondents 
to variables (Yong & Pearce, 2013).  The application of EFA was validated by examining the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin 
Measure (KMO) of sampling adequacy. The KMO was 0.96 and 0.94 for the member and trustee determined 
variables hence the two were suitable for EFA. 
Factor Extraction was then done using the Maximum Likelihood approach available in SPSS. Principal 
Components Analysis (PCA) was used to extract maximum variance from the data set with each component thus 
reducing the large number of variables to in to smaller number of variables as recommended in Tabachnick and 
Fidell (2007). Varimax rotation was then applied to enhance an optimal simple structure that ensured that each 
variable loaded on a few factors but maximized the number of high loadings for each factor. 
Lastly, the factor loadings were interpreted by identifying the largest loadings to form the variables that 
formed the pillars of a code of governance for Kenyan retirement benefit schemes. Using the recommendations in 
Tabachnick and Fiddell (2007) to the effect that a rotated loading for a sample size of at least 300 would need to 
be 0.32 to be considered statistically meaningful. To identify the factors to retain, the Kaiser’s Criterion was used 
that require retention of all factors that are above an eigen value of 1 (Kaiser, 1960) and complemented with the 
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scree tests to minimize overestimation as recommended in Costello and Osborne (2005).  
 
4.0 FINDINGS 
4.1 Particulars of the respondents 
4.1.1 Service providers 
Table 1 shows the composition of the service providers and the number of respondents who informed the findings 
of the study. It shows that the responding firms were; actuaries (100%), custodians (82%), custodians (50%), fund 
managers (48%) and administrators (48%). The 42 respondents involved in the focus group discussions were 
drawn from these constituents. 
Table 1: Composition of the service providers 
Service providers Total firms in the industry Firms that responded Number of respondents 
  n %  
Fund managers 20 10 50 12 
Administrators 29 14 48.2 15 
Custodians 11 9 81.8 9 
Actuaries 4 4 100 6 
Total    42 
 
4.1.2 Gender of the responding trustees and members 
Table 2: Gender composition of the respondents 
 Members Trustees 
 n % n % 
Female 460 45.2 132 42 
Male 556 54.6 182 58 
Total 1016 100 314 100 
In both the member and trustee samples, the number of male respondents was higher than that of the 
female respondents but the mean composition was not significantly different. Table 2 shows the gender 
composition of the responding members and trustees. 
4.1.3 Age of the respondents 
Table 3: Age composition of the respondents 
 Members Trustees 
 n % n % 
18-23 33 3.2 2 0.6 
24-29 211 20.8 33 10.5 
30-35 252 24.8 51 16.2 
36-41 178 17.5 63 20.1 
42-47 156 15.4 62 19.7 
48-52 114 11.2 59 18.8 
More than 52 72 7.1 44 14.0 
Total 1016 100 314 100 
Sixty six percent of the members (n=674 were within the 18-41 years range compared to 47.4% of the 
trustees who were in the same age bracket. The mean difference in the age of members and trustees was statistically 
significant (p<0.01) with trustees being older. 
4.1.4 Highest education level of the respondents 
Table 4: Highest education level of the respondents 
 Members Trustees 
 N % n % 
Primary 11 1.1 3 1.0 
High school 53 5.3 15 4.8 
College or polytechnic 335 33.4 71 22.6 
University first degree 417 41.6 110 35.0 
University masters’ degree 177 17.7 106 33.7 
University doctorate degree 9 0.9 9 2.9 
Total 1002 100 314 100 
In both the member and trustee samples, 94% had pursued their education beyond high school as indicated 
in table 3. There was no significance statistical difference in the education level of members and trustees. 
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4.1.5 Work experience 
Table 5: Work experience of the respondents 
Years Members Trustees 
 n % n % 
Less than 5 336 33.1 72 22.9 
6-10 354 34.8 97 30.9 
11-15 126 12.4 52 16.6 
16-20 93 9.2 49 15.6 
21-25 62 6.1 29 9.2 
More than 25 45 4.4 15 4.8 
Total 1016 100 314 100 
Most of the members (68.6%, n=697) had work experience of 15 years or less compared to 51% (n=158) 
of the trustees who had similar work experience. A statistically significant difference in the mean number of years 
of experience between the members and trustees was noted. Members who had trustees’ responsibility had more 
years of experience compared to the other members. 
4.1.6 Membership in retirement benefit schemes 
Eighty percent of the members sampled had been members of respective retirement benefit schemes for 15 years 
or less. Seventy percent of the sampled trustees had been members of retirement benefit schemes for 15 years or 
less. Additionally, 74% of the members sampled had never held trustee positions while 26% were former trustees. 
The sample of trustees consisted of 68.5% elected by members and 31.5% nominated by the sponsors. 
 
4.2 Substantive findings on governance 
4.2.1 Service provider perspectives 
The service providers were in agreement that all schemes have been established as trusts and hence have trust 
deeds that govern the schemes. The trust deeds may however need to be reviewed to determine whether they are 
aligned with current regulations, industry dynamics and changing worker demographics. The trustees are 
appointed in accordance with the law (50% sponsor and 50% members) for defined contribution schemes and (33% 
member and 67% sponsor) for defined benefit schemes except schemes that have internal administrators. Most of 
the trustees are however lay, a circumstance that can impair decision making and effective operation of the schemes. 
Main areas of expertise where trustees have inadequacies are investment management and evaluation of risks and 
returns. 
All the schemes have engaged external consultants and advisors as recommended by the industry 
regulator but conflicts of interest cannot be overruled in some of the appointments. 
Trustees receive reports from the service providers on quarterly basis. The competence with which most 
trustees provide oversight on the service providers and ask “the right questions” is however doubtful. 
Large schemes tend to have better structures and consequently higher levels of governance compared to 
the smaller schemes. However some of the schemes are already “over size” as a result of which diseconomies of 
scale are being realized. Similarly there are also small inefficient schemes that have very high administrative and 
investment management costs per participant. 
Schemes that are sponsored by the public sector face special challenges in the appointment of trustees, 
timely submission of contributions and active participation of the trustees in the board meetings. 
Trustee training and development program implemented jointly by the industry regulator and association 
has achieved benefit in making trustees more aware of their roles. It is however a one off training. Respondents 
felt that continuous education of the trustees was needed. 
Annual financial reports and statements are submitted to the members of the schemes; however the 
attendance to the annual general meetings and member training sessions is dismal. It is not clear whether the 
members of the schemes really understand the importance of the savings they make in retirement benefit schemes. 
Trustee elections and appointments are conducted in accordance with the regulations. It is however not 
apparent how the proper and fit test is enforced by the industry regulator, the sponsor or the schemes before the 
appointment. 
The rules on the operation of schemes as independent entities are enforced and both the sponsor’s and 
member’s rights are represented in the board of trustees. 
The respondents stated the need to focus on the following areas that are seen as emerging governance 
gaps; coordination of investment management function where the scheme has co-fund managers, investment in 
alternative assets (private equity, real estate investment trusts, derivatives and other innovative financial products), 
governance practices of service providers, examination of solvency risk of service providers, reserves maintained 
by the retirement benefit schemes, participation of members in the governance of retirement benefit schemes, 
conflicts of interest, governance of schemes with foreign branches, lay trustees and governance of the schemes 
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that have changed their designs from defined contribution to defined benefit. 
4.2.3 Trustee perspectives 
Table 6: Rotated Component Matrix from the results of the trustee survey 
 Component 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Having a trust deed to guide the operations of the scheme 0.899       
Following provisions stated in the trust deed 0.787       
Complying with the RBA Act 0.754       
Appointing service providers who are registered by RBA 
and other professional bodies 
0.739       
Ensuring that the scheme has legally binding service level 
agreement with external service providers 
0.689       
Clearly stipulating the consequences of breach of trust or 
regulations by trustees or service providers 
0.632       
The scheme should document its procedures, policies and 
processes 
 0.875      
The scheme should automate its processes  0.868      
The control system should address all the foreseeable 
operational risks 
 0.657      
Only trustees should access certain information relating to 
the members 
 0.654      
Define what constitutes conflict of interest and 
communicate to all trustees 
  0.877     
Having a written policy on how to identify and deal with 
conflicts of interest 
  0.872     
Ensuring that external service providers perform only one 
of the separate professional services to the scheme 
(custody of assets, fund management, administration, 
Actuarial review, legal and audit)  
  0.776     
Chair of the board of trustees is not a sponsor appointed 
trustee 
  0.723     
Providing legal or other sanctions to where conflicts of 
interests result to losses to the scheme 
  0.689     
Objectivity in decision making is critical    0.897    
All resolutions made by the board of trustees should be 
documented and communicated to all the trustees 
   0.833    
Trustees should hold regular meetings    0.824    
The board of trustees should have sub committees to deal 
with specialized issues 
   0.747    
Trustees should be allowed to seek professional advice 
from external consultants if the skills are lacking within 
the board  
   0.740    
Decisions taken by the trustees should be subjected to 
ethical tests before implementation 
   0.638    
Liability insurance for trustees is essential to protect 
trustees against litigation for decisions taken in good faith 
   0.586    
Trustees should take strategic decisions and recognize the 
impact of present decisions on the future of the scheme  
   0.556    
Monitor external service providers keenly     0.892   
Track the implementation of the investment policy     0.886   
Provide sanctions to external service providers     0.879   
Develop a framework for measuring performance of every 
external service provider 
    0.872   
Monitor the risk-return and asset-liability structure of the 
scheme continuously 
    0.698   
Conduct cost benefit analysis for every decision     0.638   
Use conventionally accepted bench marks for performance 
measurement 
    0.551   
Monitoring of schemes with co-fund managers     0.501   
The following responsibilities due to trustees should be 
documented:  
       
Keeping proper scheme records       0.816  
Evaluating Asset-liability structure of the scheme      0.783  
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 Component 
Devise proper investment strategies      0.775  
Duty to appoint external service providers      0.771  
Identifying risks and manage them effectively      0.689  
Monitoring external service providers      0.615  
Extra diligence when dealing with specialized asset classes 
such as private equity and derivatives 
     0.604  
Assessment of regulatory compliance of the scheme       0.647 
Review of audit queries and responding accordingly to 
those queries  
      0.632 
Having a documented risk management framework       0.558 
Setting risk preferences for the scheme and prioritizing 
risks  
      0.516 
Setting risk tolerance levels       0.501 
Extraction method: Principal Component Analysis 
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization 
Rotation converged in 9 iterations 
Table 6 shows the rotated component matrix for the trustee survey. The questions loaded on seven factors 
that are inferred to be the pillars on which the code of governance are developed. The factors form common themes 
that I label accordingly.  
The questions in the first component namely; having a trust deed, following the stipulations of the deed, 
complying with the RBA Act, appointing registered service providers, having legally binding service level 
agreements and stating the consequences of breach of trust and regulations are therefore labelled as compliance 
with regulatory framework.     
The questions in the second component namely; documenting or recording policies and procedures, 
automating processes, having a system that foresees operational risks and restricted access to certain information 
are labelled as; information and control systems. 
The factors in the third component seem to address conflicts of interest as they relate to; definition of 
conflicts of interest, having written policies to deal with conflicts of interest, separation of duties, chair of the 
board of trustees not being a sponsor appointed trustee and legal restitution in case of loss due to conflicts of 
interest. 
The questions in the fourth component namely; objectivity in decision making, documenting and 
communicating board resolutions, holding regular meetings, having sub committees in the board, seeking 
independent professional advice on specialized matters, ethical tests for board decisions, having liability insurance 
for the decision makers and analyzing the impact of current decisions on the future of the scheme are labelled as 
decision taking. 
The factors that load on the fifth component namely; keen monitoring of external service providers, 
implementation of the investment policy, providing sanctions to external service providers, developing a 
performance measurement framework for external service providers, monitoring the risk-return and asset-liability 
structure of the scheme, conducting a cost benefit analysis for decisions taken, using conventionally accepted 
bench marks for performance measurement and monitoring schemes with co-fund managers are labelled as; 
Monitoring, oversight and performance management.    
The factors that load on the sixth component relate to documentation on the roles of trustees with regard 
to: keeping proper scheme records, evaluating asset-liability structure of the scheme, making proper investment 
strategies, appointing external service providers, identifying risks and managing them effectively and monitoring 
external service providers are labelled documentation of trustee responsibilities. 
Lastly, the factors that load on the seventh component are; assessment of regulatory compliance of the 
scheme, review of audit queries, documenting the risk management framework, setting risk preferences for the 
scheme, setting risk tolerance levels and exercising special diligence before investment in alternative assets are 
labelled risk management. 
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4.2.4 Member perspectives 
Table 7: Rotated Component Matrix from the results of the member survey 
 Components 
 1 2 3 4 
We should elect trustees who meet high levels of integrity 0.841    
Trustees should be accountable to current members of the scheme as well as 
the leavers 
0.809    
Trustees should be legally liable for imprudence regarding management of 
scheme affairs 
0.808    
External trustees should be independent and objective 0.782    
The trustees should keep confidential matters of the scheme and members to 
themselves 
0.756    
Trustees should disclose their remuneration 0.764    
Trustees should disclose the investment classes where the scheme’s assets are 
held 
0.701    
Trustees should disclose the costing model of the fees payable to service 
providers 
0.698    
Costs of the scheme should be disaggregated and disclosed to members 0.621    
Trustees should not have financial or other interests with external service 
providers 
0.598    
Trustees should be well trained and meet certain minimum education 
requirements 
 0.812   
The board of trustees should have a diversified set of skills  0.624   
Newly appointed trustees should be taken through an induction program  0.609   
Trustees should be continuously trained  0.587   
Circulating a biography of all potential trustees before an election   0.574   
Communication to members is critical   0.799  
Holding annual general meetings with members is critical   0.744  
Having free and fair elections of the trustees   0.675  
Providing member education on rights and responsibilities of the scheme   0.633  
Providing members who are leaving the scheme through retirement or 
resignation with information on the choices available to them 
  0.610  
Acting in good faith in the adjudication of member benefits where the 
member’s is deceased 
  0.575  
Providing annual financial and non-financial reports that are free of 
misrepresentation 
  0.573  
Providing member statements that are accurate   0.564  
Providing full disclosure of costs in a disaggregated manner   0.561  
Providing all information to members on time   0.558  
Precise and clear presentation of information during meetings with members 
free of jargons and waffles 
  0.541  
Provide information to members on:      
 Investment performance    0.680 
 Rules of the scheme    0.613 
 Computation of benefits    0.567 
 Rights during retirement    0.555 
 Rights during resignation    0.542 
 Entitlements in case of death    0.511 
Extraction method: Principal Component Analysis 
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization 
Rotation converged in 5 iterations 
Table 7 lists the questions that loaded on four distinct components in the member survey that were later 
assigned labels. The first set of questions clustering around component 1 are election of trustees with integrity 
levels, accountability of trustees to members and leavers of the scheme, holding trustees liable for imprudence, 
independence and objectivity of external service providers, confidentiality of the trust matters, disclosure of trustee 
remuneration, investment classes and charging model for the costs of the service providers, disaggregating costs 
of the scheme and trustees should not have pecuniary or other interests with external service providers. This 
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component is consequently labelled as trustee’ transparency and accountability.  
The second set of questions that clustered around component 2 are; well-trained trustees who meet certain 
minimum education requirements, board of trustees having diversified set of skills, inducting new trustees, 
continuous training of trustees and circulation of biographies for nominees of trust positions. This component is 
therefore labelled; competence of trustees. 
The third set of factors that loaded on component 3 are; communication to members, holding annual 
members’ meeting, free and fair election of trustees, providing education to members on their rights and 
responsibilities, giving information to the leavers of the scheme, acting in good faith in the best of the interest of 
a deceased member, providing information that is precise and free from misrepresentations, providing accurate 
member statements, full disclosure of costs in a disaggregated manner, timely provision of information and 
simplicity when reporting to members. This component is labelled responsibility to members. 
The last set of factors that loaded on component 4 relate to information provision. Most important 
information to communicate to members should relate to investment performance, rules of the scheme, 
computation of benefits and entitlements from the scheme, rights of members during retirement and resignation as 
well as their entitlements in the event of death. 
 
5.0 DISCUSSION OF THE RESULTS 
The present study has listed eleven pillars on which a code of governance for the Kenyan retirement benefit 
schemes should be anchored. The pillars are; compliance with regulatory framework, information control systems, 
decision taking, managing conflicts of interest, monitoring, oversight and performance management, 
documentation of trustee responsibilities, risk management, transparency and accountability, competence of 
trustees, trustees’ responsibilities to members and providing relevant information to members. These results agree 
with Stewart and Yermo (2008) who recommend clarity in definition of trustee responsibilities, fit and proper tests 
for trustees, self-assessment and training as well as management of conflicts of interest to improve pension fund 
governance. Although Stewart and Yermo (2008) recommend a review of the number of individuals in the board 
of trustees, having management committees for defined contribution schemes and greater regulation of the 
schemes, the factors did not load on any component in the present study and were therefore omitted. 
The present study further agrees with Pensions Regulator (2013) who state the critical elements of pension 
governance as ensuring value for money, monitoring performance of the service providers and communication 
and member engagements. The present study adds more elements such as conflict management, risk management, 
information provision to members and trustee competence and responsibilities. 
Additionally, the study concurs with Clark (2004) who state that the main issues that will relate with 
future pension arrangements include enhancement of the welfare of the workers, trustee representing the 
stakeholders’ present and future interests, oversight over external service providers, remuneration of trustees, 
trustee meetings (frequency, attendance, agenda setting and preparation) as well as investment in alternative assets.  
IOPS (2013) further documents the need for a solid framework for governance of pension supervisory 
authorities based on independence, adequacy, transparency and integrity. The present study concurs that these 
principles can be replicated in retirement benefit schemes in advocacy of the principle that governance of the 
regulating authority should as much as possible mirror those of the objects under supervision. 
Lastly, the findings also mirror the updated principles, best practice guidance and tools issued by the 
Pensions Regulator who lists six principles in governance of the pension fund industry namely; effective decision 
making, clear objectives, review of risk and liabilities, performance assessment, responsible ownership and 
transparency and reporting.   
 
6.0 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This study has used a multi-faceted methodology to develop a foundational code of governance for Kenyan 
retirement benefit schemes that can be replicated in other countries. The building blocks of the code of governance 
are; compliance with regulatory framework, information control systems, decision taking, managing conflicts of 
interest, monitoring, oversight and performance management, documentation of trustee responsibilities, risk 
management, transparency and accountability, competence of trustees, trustees’ responsibilities to members and 
providing relevant information to members.  
I recommend that these pillars together with the factors that build into them be used by trustees of 
retirement benefit schemes to formulate customized codes of governance. Regulators of retirement benefit schemes 
should also find it a suitable reference point when developing regulations aimed at containing the governance of 
retirement benefit schemes. 
Future research should focus on using the code as developed in this study to device a governance index 
that should be used to evaluate the governance of retirement benefit schemes. 
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